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Abstract
Allocating resources to defend targets from attack is often
complicated by uncertainty about the attacker’s capabilities,
objectives, or other underlying characteristics. In a repeated
interaction setting, the defender can collect attack data over
time to reduce this uncertainty and learn an effective defense.
However, a clever attacker can manipulate the attack data to
mislead the defender, influencing the learning process toward
its own benefit. We investigate strategic deception on the part
of an attacker with private type information, who interacts
repeatedly with a defender. We present a detailed computa-
tion and analysis of both players’ optimal strategies given the
attacker may play deceptively. Computational experiments
illuminate conditions conducive to strategic deception, and
quantify benefits to the attacker. By taking into account the
attacker’s deception capacity, the defender can significantly
mitigate loss from misleading attack actions.
Introduction
Real-worldsecuritydomainsareoftencharacterizedby imper-
fect information: uncertainty (particularly on the defender’s
part) about actions taken or underlying characteristics of the
opposing agent. Experience observed through repeated inter-
action in such domains provides an opportunity for the de-
fender to learn about the behaviors and characteristics of at-
tacker(s) (Kar et al., 2017; Gholami et al., 2017; Haghtalab
et al., 2016; Nguyen et al., 2016; Xu, Tran-Thanh, and Jen-
nings, 2016; Balcan et al., 2015; Blum, Haghtalab, and Pro-
caccia, 2014; Marecki, Tesauro, and Segal, 2012; Letchford,
Conitzer, and Munagala, 2009). For example, in wildlife pro-
tection (Fang et al., 2016), repeated interaction with poachers
allows the defense authorities to observe poaching signs and
patterns over time. From these observations, the defender may
inferfeaturesofthepoacher’scapabilitiesandpreferences,and
thus design more effective patrolling strategies.
To the extent that the defender relies on data, however,
the attacker may choose to modify its behavior to mislead
the defender. That is, in a particular interaction the attacker
may select an action that does not actually yield the best im-
mediate reward, to avoid revealing sensitive private informa-
tion. Such deceptive behavior could manipulate the outcome
of learning to the long-term benefit of the attacker. A savvy
Copyright c© 2019, Association for the Advancement of Artificial
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defender, therefore, would take into account the attacker’s
manipulative strategy in designing his own strategy. We la-
bel an attacker strategy as non-manipulative if it chooses an
action without regard to the defender’s learning, for exam-
ple if its behavior in each stage is a myopic best response.
Previous work on learning in security games has generally
treated the attacker as non-manipulative in this sense (Blum,
Haghtalab, and Procaccia, 2014; Marecki, Tesauro, and Se-
gal, 2012).
We study the strategic deployment of attacker deception
in finitely repeated security games. We adopt an incomplete-
information model, where the defender has underlying un-
certainty about the attacker’s type. At each time step, the
defender updates his belief on the attacker’s type based on
attack data collected at previous steps. Based on the updated
belief, the defender chooses an action to play. The attacker
decides its own action, aware that the defender is collecting
attack data to infer about the attacker’s type. The ultimate
goal of both players is to maximize expected utility accu-
mulated over the whole time horizon. A pair of strategies
that best-respond to each other, accounting for observations,
constitutes a Perfect Bayesian Nash Equilibrium (PBNE).
The paper includes four main contributions. First, we
present a non-linear optimization program to find a PBNE
of the finitely repeated simultaneous-move game. Second,
we present a result that provides an easy technique to find
a sequential equilibrium of the game based on a computed
PBNE. Third, we show that there exists a PBNE in which
players’ equilibrium strategies depend only on histories of
the attacker’s actions. This allows us to represent both play-
ers’ strategies in a compact form, which helps in signifi-
cantly speeding up the equilibrium computation of the game.
Fourth, we provide a preliminary extension to the Stackel-
berg game (sequential move) setting.
Finally, we present a detailed experimental analysis of
strategic deception, showing how various game factors af-
fect the tendency for the attacker to deviate from myopic
best responses to mislead the defender. Our results show that
the defender and attacker receive significant loss and benefit
respectively if the defender does not address the attacker’s
deception. By taking into account deceptive attacks, such
loss and benefit is reduced drastically.
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Related Work
Learning in security games. Most existing work on learn-
ing in security games follows a Stackelberg model and as-
sumes the attacker plays myopically at every time step (Kar
et al., 2017; Gholami et al., 2017; Haghtalab et al., 2016;
Nguyen et al., 2016; Blum, Haghtalab, and Procaccia, 2014;
Marecki, Tesauro, and Segal, 2012; Letchford, Conitzer, and
Munagala, 2009). Balcan et al. (2015) and Xu, Tran-Thanh,
and Jennings (2016) study the problem of learning with
no prior knowledge of the attacker’s behavior. They take
a regret-minimization approach to determine the defender’s
strategies at each time step.
Secrecy and deception in security games. Previous work
studies security scenarios in which information available to
the defender and attacker is asymmetric (Guo et al., 2017;
Xu et al., 2015; Rabinovich et al., 2015; Hendricks and
McAfee, 2006; Brown et al., 2005; Farrell and Rabin, 1996;
Zhuang, Bier, and Alagoz, 2010). The defender can ex-
ploit that information asymmetricity to strategically reveal
or disguise his information to the attacker. This results in re-
sponses of the attacker which are in favor of the defender.
For example, in the model of Guo et al. (2017), the defender
can disguise defense resources to deceive the attacker about
the defender’s type. We study an opposite scenario in which
the attacker acts deceptively to mislead the defender.
Repeated games with incomplete information. Previous
work has studied infinitely repeated games with incomplete
information (Sorin, 2002; Aumann and Maschler, 1995; Jor-
dan, 1995; Zamir, 1992; Forges, 1988). These studies ana-
lyze properties and the convergence of players’ strategies in
an infinitely repeated game setting. We study the problem
of one-sided incomplete information (i.e., uncertainty in the
attacker’s type) in finitely repeated security games.
Adversarial machine learning. There have been several
studies on adversarial machine learning, attempting to in-
vestigate different attack scenarios on machine learning al-
gorithms (Bru¨ckner, Kanzow, and Scheffer, 2012; Bru¨ckner
and Scheffer, 2011; Barreno et al., 2010, 2006; Lowd and
Meek, 2005). For example, causative attacks alters the train-
ing process by influencing the training data or exploratory
attacks attempts to discover information about the learner
and its training data. Different machine learning algorithms
are then proposed which can resist these sophisticated at-
tacks. Our work focuses on a causative attack scenario in
security games. We aim at obtaining effective defense strate-
gies which minimizes the damage of deceptive attacks in se-
curity games, given some learning outcome of attack data.
Game Model
In a finitely repeated simultaneous-move security game,
there is a set of N targets, denoted by N = {1, . . . , N}. A
defender attempts to protect these targets by allocating lim-
ited security resources over these targets. Conversely, an at-
tacker aims at attacking these targets. We denote by K < N
the number of the defender’s security resources. At each
time step t in a finite time horizon T = {1, . . . , T}, both
the defender and the attacker has to decide on which action
to take. An action of the defender, s, is an allocation of K
resources over N. We denote by S the set of all feasible ac-
tions of the defender. An action of the attacker is a target
to attack. There is a set of attacker types Λ = {1, . . . , L}.
Each type λ ∈ Λ has a prior probability pλ ∈ (0, 1) such
that
∑
λ p
λ = 1. At the beginning, Nature randomly draws
a type to play the game according to a prior distribution
{pλ}λ. The attacker knows its type while the defender does
not. The defender is aware of {pλ}λ.
Player payoffs. Each target i ∈ N is associated with re-
wards and penalties of the defender,
(
Rd(i), P d(i)
)
, and the
attacker,
(
Rλ(i), Pλ(i)
)
, for every type λ ∈ Λ. When the at-
tacker of type λ ∈ Λ attacks i, if the defender is protecting
i, the attacker receives a penalty Pλ(i) while the defender
obtains a reward Rd(i). Conversely, if the defender is not
protecting target i, the attacker gets Rλ(i) > Pλ(i) while
the defender receives P d(i) < Rd(i).
Player observations. At t + 1 ∈ T, both play-
ers observe their actions at previous time steps ht =
{(s1, i1), . . . , (st, it)} where st′ and it′ are the defender and
the attacker actions respectively at time step t′. We denote by
Ht the set of all possible histories of length t and H = {Ht}
(where t = 0, . . . , T−1) the set of all histories. In particular,
H0 = ∅. We denote by hat = {i1, . . . , it} a history of the
attacker’s actions and Hat the set of all these attack histories.
Behavioral strategies. At each step t + 1, given a history
ht ∈ Ht, a behavioral strategy of the defender is a proba-
bility distribution x(ht) = {x(s | ht) :
∑
s x(s | ht) =
1, x(s | ht) ∈ [0, 1],∀s ∈ S} over the defender’s action
set S. x(s | ht) is the probability the defender takes action
s ∈ S given the history ht. Similarly, a behavioral strat-
egy of the attacker of type λ is a probability distribution
yλ(ht) = {yλ(i | ht) :
∑
i y
λ(i | ht) = 1, yλ(i | ht) ∈
[0, 1],∀i ∈ N} over the attacker’s actions N. yλ(i | ht) is
the probability the attacker of type λ attacks target i given
ht. We denote by x = {x(ht)} and yλ = {yλ(ht)} strate-
gies of the defender and attacker of type λ over all ht ∈ H
respectively. Finally, X and Y = {Yλ} denote the sets of
all strategies x and yλ respectively.
Player expected utilities. Let x and y = {yλ} be the de-
fender and attacker’s behavioral strategies respectively. At
each t+ 1, the defender can update his belief on the attacker
types using the Bayes rule, which is formulated as:
p(λ | ht) ∝ pλ
∏t
t′=1
yλ(it′ | ht′−1)
where h0 = ∅,ht′ = {ht′−1, it′}. Let:
EUdi (x,ht)=
[∑
s:i∈sx(s |ht)
](
Rd(i)−P d(i))+P d(i)
EUλi (x,ht)=
[∑
s:i∈sx(s |ht)
](
Pλ(i)−Rλ(i))+Rλ(i)
be immediate expected utilities of the defender and the at-
tacker of type λ respectively at target i at step t+1 given the
defender plays x(ht). Based on the immediate expected util-
ities at every target, the players’ total expected utilities over
T can be computed using backward induction as follows.
At the last time step T , the total expected utilities of the
defender and the attacker with respect to history hT−1 ∈
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HT−1 is equal to their immediate expected utilities at hT−1:
UdT (x,y | hT−1)=
∑
λ,i
p(λ |hT−1)yλ(i |hT−1)EUdi (x,hT−1)
UλT (x,y | hT−1) =
∑
i
yλ(i | hT−1)EUλi (x,hT−1),∀λ
At time step t + 1 < T , the total expected utilities of
both players with respect to history ht ∈ Ht consists of
(i) the immediate expected utility at t+ 1; and (ii) the future
expected utility after t+ 1. These utilities are formulated as:
Udt+1(x,y | ht) =
∑
λ,i
p(λ | ht)yλ(i | ht)EUdi (x,ht)
+
∑
s,λ,i
x(s | ht)p(λ | ht)yλ(i | ht)Udt+2(x,y | ht,(s, i))
Uλt+1(x,y | ht) =
∑
i
yλ(i | ht)EUλi (x,ht)
+
∑
s,i
x(s | ht)yλ(i | ht)Uλt+2(x,y | ht, (s, i)), ∀λ
Player’s goals. Given any history ht, both players aim at
choosing strategies x(ht), {yλ(ht)} that maximize their to-
tal expected utility at ht. In this scenario, the attacker is no
longer myopic; it has to reason about all future possibilities
to decide on which behavioral strategy to play at each ht.
Such attack strategies (which may not be myopically opti-
mal) are chosen to mislead the defender about the attacker’s
type, ultimately benefiting the attacker in future steps. These
optimal behavioral strategies of players form a PBNE.
Game Equilibria
Definition 1 (PBNE). Behavioral strategies of the defender
x∗ and attacker y∗ form a PBNE of the game if and only if
for every ht ∈ Ht that occurs, we have:
• x∗ is the best response of the defender:
Udt+1(x
∗,y∗ | ht) ≥ Udt+1(x,y∗ | ht),∀x ∈ X
• yλ,∗ is the best response of the attacker type λ:
Uλt+1(x
∗,y∗ | ht) ≥ Uλt+1(x∗,y | ht),∀y ∈ Y
Since the action sets of both players are finite, there al-
ways exists a PBNE of the game. Our first result extends a
given PBNE to a refined sequential equilibrium.
Theorem 1. For each PBNE, there is a sequential equilib-
rium in which players’ strategies are identical to the ones in
the PBNE at histories that occur with a positive probability.
Proof. We denote by (x,y) a PBNE of the game. We fol-
low the trembling-hand approach to find a corresponding se-
quential equilibrium of (x,y). Let rd(ht) and rλ(ht) be the
ratios of the number of zero probabilities to the number of
non-zero probabilities in x(ht) and yλ(ht) respectively. For
each  > 0, we construct a new fully mixed behavioral strat-
egy of the defender and the attacker, (x,y), as follows:
x(s | ht) = , if x(s | ht) = 0
x(s | ht) = x(s | ht)−  ∗ rd(ht), if x(s | ht) > 0
yλ (i | ht) = , if yλ(i | ht) = 0
yλ (i | ht) = yλ(i | ht)−  ∗ rλ(ht), if yλ(i | ht) > 0
 is chosen to be small enough such that all resulting prob-
abilities are positive. We use the breath-first search (accord-
ing to the time horizon T) to examine the whole history set.
When encountering a history with a zero probability of oc-
currence p(ht) = 0 according to (x,y), we construct a new
belief of the defender over attacker types at ht as follows:
p′(λ |ht)= lim
→0
p(λ |ht)= lim
→0
pλ
∏
t′ y
λ
 (it′|ht′−1)∑
λ′p
λ′
∏
t′y
λ′
 (it′|ht′−1)
We find a PBNE of the corresponding sub-game starting
from this history ht with this new belief. We then replace the
strategies of the sub-game in (x,y) with these new equilib-
rium strategies. We also update (x,y) accordingly with the
updated strategies of the sub-game. This process will con-
tinue until all histories are examined. The resulting strategies
(x′,y′) with belief {p′(λ | ht)} belong to a sequential equi-
librium of the game. Indeed, it is straightforward to prove:
x′(s | ht) = lim
→0
x(s | ht)
yλ,
′
(i | ht) = lim
→0
yλ (i | ht)
p′(λ | ht) = lim
→0
p(λ | ht) (by definition)
Furthermore, the updating process only replaces strategies in
(x,y) at histories ht with a zero-probability of occurrence
by a PBNE of the sub-game at ht respective to the belief
p′(λ | ht). Therefore, (x′,y′) is the best response of the
players at every ht according to p′(λ | ht).
Next, we present a result that enables a compact repre-
sentation of the game. We denote by Xa a subset of behav-
ioral strategies of the defender in which all the strategies are
independent of histories of the defender’s actions. In other
words, for all x ∈ Xa, x(s | ht) = x(s | hat ) for every
history ht where hat is the corresponding history of attacker
actions. Similarly, Ya is a subset of behavioral strategies of
the attacker.
Theorem 2. There exists a PBNE of the game in which the
equilibrium strategies of the players only depend on the his-
tories of the attacker’s actions.
Proof. We use Brouwer’s fixed-point theorem and a back-
ward induction method. We are going to show that there ex-
ists a PBNE x∗ ∈ Xa and y∗ ∈ Ya such that: ∀ht
Udt+1(x
∗,y∗ | ht) ≥ Udt+1(x,y∗ | ht),∀x ∈ X (1)
Uλt+1(x
∗,y∗ | ht) ≥ Uλt+1(x∗,y | ht),∀y ∈ Y (2)
We denote by x{x(ht)← s} the defender strategy obtained
by replacing x(ht) in x by a defense action s. Similarly,
yλ{yλ(ht)← i} is the attacker strategy of type λ obtained
by replacing yλ(ht) in yλ by an attack action i. We define:
φ
d
s(x,y |ht)=max{0, Udt+1(x{x(ht)←s},y |ht)−Udt+1(x,y |ht)}
φ
λ
i(x,y |ht)=max{0, Uλt+1(x,y{yλ(ht)← i}) |ht)−Uλt+1(x,y |ht)}
which are non-negative continuous functions in (x,y). We
define a function F : (Xa,Ya) → (Xa,Ya) as follows:
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F (x,y) = (x′,y′) where
x′(s | ht) = x(s | ht) + φ
d
s(x,y | ht)∑
s′ x(s
′ | ht) + φds′(x,y | ht)
yλ,
′
(i | ht) = y
λ(i | ht) + φλi (x,y | ht)∑
j y
λ(j | ht) + φλj (x,y | ht)
Since F is continuous over a convex and compact set
(Xa,Ya), there exists (x∗,y∗) such that F (x∗,y∗) =
(x∗,y∗) according to the Brouwer’s fixed point theorem.
On the other hand, according to the linearity of expecta-
tion, there must be an action s such that Udt+1(x
∗{x∗(ht)←
s},y∗ |ht)− Udt+1(x∗,y∗ |ht) ≤ 0, meaning that φds(x,y |
ht) = 0. Therefore, we have:
x∗(s | ht) = x
∗(s | ht)
1 +
∑
s′ φ
d
s′(x
∗,y∗ | ht)
This implies φds′(x
∗,y∗ | ht) = 0,∀s′. Similarly,
φλi (x
∗,y∗ | ht) = 0,∀i. As a result, we obtain:
Udt+1(x
∗{x∗(ht)← s},y∗ |ht) ≤ Udt+1(x∗,y∗ |ht) (3)
Uλt+1(x
∗,y∗{yλ,∗(ht)← i}) |ht) ≤ Uλt+1(x∗,y∗ |ht) (4)
for all s and i and ht. While the above result holds for any
convex and compact (Xa,Ya), showing that the fixed point
profile provides more utility than any deviation to X or Y
requires (Xa,Ya) to depend on the attacker’s past actions.
This dependence is due to the dependence of the posterior
belief on the attacker’s past actions, as can be seen in the
next steps of the proof. Based on the above inequalities, we
show that (x∗,y∗) satisfy (1–2) using backward induction.
At last time step T , for every x ∈ X, we have:
UdT (x
∗,y∗ | hT−1)
≥
∑
s
x(s |hT−1)UdT (x∗{x∗(hT−1)←s},y∗ |hT−1)
= UdT (x,y
∗ | hT−1)
Therefore, x∗ is the defender best response against the at-
tacker’s strategy y∗ at time step T .
At time step t + 1 < T , suppose that (1–2) hold true for
all t′ > t+ 1, then for every x ∈ X, we have:
Udt+1(x
∗,y∗ | ht)
≥
∑
s
x(s | ht)Udt+1(x∗{x∗(ht)←s},y∗ | ht)
=
∑
λ,i
p(λ |ht)yλ,∗(i |ht)EUdi (x,ht) +
∑
s
x(s | ht)
×
∑
i,λ
p(λ | ht)yλ,∗(i | ht)Udt+2(x∗,y∗ | ht,(s, i))
≥
∑
λ,i
p(λ |ht)yλ,∗(i |ht)EUdi (x,ht) +
∑
s
x(s | ht)
×
∑
i,λ
p(λ | ht)yλ,∗(i | ht)Udt+2(x,y∗ | ht,(s, i))
= Udt+1(x,y
∗ | ht)
Therefore, x∗ is the defender best response against the at-
tacker’s strategy y∗ at t + 1. Similarly, y∗ is the attacker’s
best response against x∗ at all time steps.
Equilibrium Computation
Based on Theorem 2, in computing a PBNE, we only need
to search over the strategy sets (Xa,Ya). We also only
need to consider attack histories {hat }. We can now repre-
sent the defender behavioral strategies as compact marginal
coverage probabilities over targets. We overload the nota-
tion x(hat ) = {x(i | hat )} where x(i | hat ) is the de-
fender’s coverage probability at target i at history hat such
that
∑
i x(i | hat ) ≤ K and x(i | hat ) ∈ [0, 1] for all i ∈ N.
In particular, x(i | hat ) =
∑
s:i∈s x(s | hat ). The players’
immediate and total expected utilities can be reformulated
accordingly as follows:
EUdi (x,h
a
t ) = x(i | hat )(Rd(i)− P d(i)) + P d(i) (5)
EUλi (x,h
a
t ) = x(i | hat )(Pλ(i)−Rλ(i)) +Rλ(i) (6)
Udt+1(x,y | hat ) =
∑
λ,i
p(λ | hat )yλ(i | hat )EUdi (x,hat )
+
∑
i,λ
p(λ | hat )yλ(i | hat )Udt+2(x,y | hat , i) (7)
Uλt+1(x,y | hat ) =
∑
i
yλ(i | hat )EUλi (x,hat )
+
∑
i
yλ(i | hat )Uλt+2(x,y | hat , i) (8)
Note that the total expected utilities of players at last time
step UdT (x,y | haT−1) and UλT (x,y | haT−1) do not have the
second term (which represents the future expected utility) as
in Equations (7–8). In the following, we present a backward-
induction based method to find the attacker (defender) best
response against a fixed behavioral strategy of the defender
(attacker). We then introduce a program to compute a PBNE
based on these best-response solutions.
Attacker best response
Given a defender’s strategy x, we can compute a best re-
sponse of the attacker of type λ using backward induction:
At last time step T . Given a history haT−1, finding a best
response of the attacker type λ against x is formulated as the
following linear program:
max
yλ(haT−1)
∑
i
yλ(i | haT−1)EUλi (x,haT−1) (9)
s.t.
∑
i
yλ(i |haT−1) = 1, yλ(i |haT−1)≥0,∀i (10)
which maximizes the attacker’s total expected utility at
haT−1. Its corresponding dual program:
min
vλ(haT−1)
vλ(haT−1) (11)
s.t. vλ(haT−1) ≥ EUλi (x,haT−1),∀i ∈ N. (12)
According to complementary slackness, any optimal primal
and dual solutions (yλ,∗(haT−1), v
λ
∗ (h
a
T−1)) satisfies: ∀i
yλ,∗(i | haT−1)
[
vλ∗ (h
a
T−1)− EUλi (x,haT−1)
]
= 0 (13)
At time step t+ 1 < T . Given a history hat , finding a best
response of the attacker type λ is formulated as:
max
yλ(hat )
∑
i
yλ(i |hat )
[
EUλi (x,h
a
t ) + v
λ
∗ (h
a
t , i)
]
(14)
s.t.
∑
i
yλ(i |hat ) = 1, yλ(i |hat ) ≥ 0,∀i ∈ N. (15)
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which maximizes the attacker’s total expected utility at hat
where vλ∗ (h
a
t , i) is the attacker’s optimal total expected util-
ity at (hat , i). Its corresponding dual program:
min
vλ(hat )
vλ(hat ) (16)
s.t. vλ(hat ) ≥ EUλi (x,hat ) + vλ∗ (hat , i),∀i (17)
According to complementary slackness: any optimal solu-
tion (yλ,∗(hat ), v
λ
∗ (h
a
t )) must satisfy: ∀i:
yλ,∗(i |ht)
[
vλ∗(ht)−EUλi (x,ht)−vλ∗(ht, i)
]
=0 (18)
Defender best response
Given an attack strategy y, we denote by:
p¯(λ | hat ) = pλ
∏t
t′=1
yλ(it′ | hat′−1)
Then the defender’s belief on attacker types at each history
hat can be computed as follows:
p(λ | hat ) =
p¯(λ | hat )∑
λ′ p¯(λ
′ | hat )
(19)
Similar to the computation of a best response of attacker,
we can compute a best response of the defender against an
attack strategy y using backward induction as follows:
At last time step T . Given a history haT−1, finding a best
response x(haT−1) can be formulated as:
max
∑
λ
p¯(λ |haT−1)
∑
i
yλ(i |hT−1)EUdi (x,haT−1) (20)
s.t.
∑
i
x(i |hT−1)≤K,x(i |hT−1)∈ [0, 1],∀i. (21)
Proposition 1. For every attack history haT−1, we denote
by vd∗(h
a
T−1) the defender’s optimal total expected utility
against the attacker’s strategy y at haT−1. Then:
vd∗(h
a
T−1) =
v¯d∗(h
a
T−1)∑
λ′ p¯(λ
′ | haT−1)
The proof of Proposition 1 is in the appendix.1 Here,
v¯d∗(h
a
T−1) the optimal objective of (20–21). By removing
the constant P d(i) in EUdi (x,h
a
T−1) (Equation 5) and tak-
ing the dualty, we obtain the corresponding dual program:
min Kv¯d(0 | haT−1) +
∑
i
v¯d(i | haT−1) (22)
s.t. v¯d(0 | haT−1) ≥ 0, v¯d(i | haT−1) ≥ 0,∀i (23)
v¯d(0 | haT−1) + v¯d(i | haT−1) ≥ (24)∑
λ
p¯(λ | haT−1)yλ(i | haT−1)
(
Rd(i)−P d(i)) ,∀i.
According to complementary slackness, any optimal solu-
tions (x∗(haT−1), {v¯d∗(i |haT−1)}, v¯d∗(0 |haT−1)) satisfies: ∀i
x∗(i | haT−1)[v¯d∗(0 | haT−1) + v¯d∗(i | haT−1) (25)
−
∑
λ
p¯(λ |haT−1)yλ(i |haT−1)
(
Rd(i)− P d(i))] = 0
v¯d∗(i | haT−1)
[
x∗(i | haT−1)− 1
]
= 0 (26)
v¯d∗(0 | haT−1)
[∑
j
x∗(j | haT−1)−K
]
= 0 (27)
1Link: https://ix.cs.uoregon.edu/∼thanhhng/publications/
ConfPaper/AAAI19 Appendix.pdf
At time step t + 1 < T . Given a history hat , finding an
optimal behavioral strategy x(hat ) can be formulated as the
following program:
max
x(hat )
∑
λ,i
p¯(λ | hat )yλ(i | hat )EUdi (x,hat ) (28)
+
∑
i
v¯d∗(h
a
t , i)
s.t.
∑
i
x(i | hat ) ≤ K,x(i | hat ) ∈ [0, 1],∀i (29)
We denote by v¯d∗(h
a
t ) the optimal objective of (28–29) at
ht. In (28), v¯d∗(h
a
t , i) is the optimal objective of this primal
program (28–29) but with respect to the history (hat , i).
Proposition 2. For every attack history hat , we denote by
vd∗(h
a
t ) the defender’s optimal total expected utility against
the attacker’s strategy y at hat . Then:
vd∗(h
a
t ) =
v¯d∗(h
a
t )∑
λ′ p¯(λ
′ | hat )
The proof of Proposition 2 is in the appendix. In (28), the
term
∑
i v¯
d
∗(h
a
t , i) and the term P
d(i) in EUdi (x,h
a
t ) are
constant. By removing these constants and taking the dual,
we obtain the corresponding dual program:
min Kv¯d(0 | hat ) +
∑
i
v¯d(i | hat ) (30)
s.t. v¯d(0 | hat ) ≥ 0, v¯d(i | hat ) ≥ 0,∀i ∈ N (31)
v¯d(0 | hat ) + v¯d(i | hat ) ≥ (32)∑
λ
p¯(λ | ht)yλ(i | hat )
(
Rd(i)− P d(i)) ,∀i.
According to complementary slackness, any optimal solu-
tion (x∗(hat ), {v¯d∗(i | hat )}, v¯d∗(0 | hat )) satisfies: ∀i:
x∗(i | hat )
[
v¯d∗(0 | hat ) + v¯d∗(i | hat )− (33)∑
λ
p¯(λ | hat )yλ(i | hat )
(
Rd(i)− P d(i))] = 0
v¯d∗(i | hat ) [x∗(i | hat )− 1] = 0 (34)
v¯d∗(0 | hat )
[∑
i
x∗(i | hat )−K
]
= 0 (35)
Equilibrium computation program
Based on the computation of players’ best responses,
a pair of behavioral strategies (x,y) forms a PBNE if
and only if these strategies satisfy (i) the feasibility con-
straints (21,23,24,29,31,32) and (10,12,15,17); and (ii) the
complementary slackness constraints (25–27, 33–35) and
(13, 18). Since finding strategies which satisfy these slack-
ness constraints is not straightforward, we convert the prob-
lem of finding a PBNE into the following program:
min δ such that ∀i,hat : (36)
δ ≥ yλ(i | hat )
[
vλ(hat )− EUλi (x,hat )− vλ(hat , i)
]
(37)
δ ≥ x(i | hat )
[
v¯d(0 | hat ) + v¯d(i | hat ) (38)
−
∑
λ
p¯(λ | hat )yλ(i | hat )
(
Rd(i)− P d(i))]
δ ≥ v¯d(i | hat ) [x(i | hat )− 1] (39)
δ ≥ v¯d(0 | hat )
[∑
i
x(i | hat )−K
]
(40)
Constraints (21,23,24,29,31,32), (10,12,15,17) (41)
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where vλ(hat , i) = 0 if t = T −1. Constraints (37) and (38–
40) correspond to the complementary slackness constraints
of the attacker and defender respectively. Note that any equi-
librium of the game is a feasible solution of the program
(36–41) which returns an objective value of δ = 0. On the
other hand, the right-hand side of constraints (37–40) is al-
ways non-negative due to constraint (41). Thus, δ ≥ 0 for all
feasible solutions of the program (36–41). It means that any
equilibrium of the game is an optimal solution of (36–41).
In addition, since the optimal objective value δ = 0, any op-
timal solution of (36–41) returns a value of zero for all the
right-hand sides of (37–40). Therefore, any optimal solution
of this program is a PBNE.
Extension to Stackelberg Setting
In the Stackelberg game model, a mixed strategy of the de-
fender is defined as a probability distribution m = {m(s) :∑
s m(s) = 1,m(s) ∈ [0, 1]} over the action set S. We de-
note by M the set of all mixed strategies of the defender.
At each time step, the defender commits to a mixed strategy.
The attacker is aware of that mixed strategy and then decides
which target to attack. Therefore, in finitely repeated Stack-
elberg games, at each time step t + 1, an observation of the
defender is a history ht = {(m1, i1), . . . , (mt, it)} while
an observation of the attacker is a history (ht,mt+1).
The behavioral strategy of the defender at ht is a proba-
bility distribution x(ht) = {x(m | ht) :
∑
m x(m | ht) =
1, x(m | ht) ∈ [0, 1]} over the set of mixed strategies of
the defender. On the other hand, a behavioral strategy of
the attacker of type λ at (ht,mt+1) is a probability distri-
bution yλ(ht,mt+1) = {yλ(i | ht,mt+1) :
∑
i y
λ(i |
ht,mt+1) = 1, y
λ(i | ht,mt+1) ∈ [0, 1]}. A PBNE
of Stackelberg security games is then defined similarly as
simultaneous-move games. Since the set of mixed strategies
of the defender is infinite, the existence of a PBNE in Stack-
elberg security games is an open research question. Never-
theless, we can compute an -PBNE by discretizing this set
of defense mixed strategies and applying the same backward
induction method as in the simultaneous case.
We specifically analyze the deception of the attacker in
finitely repeated Stackelberg security games with |N| = 2,
|Λ| = 2, and K = 1. We adopt the tradition in Stackel-
berg security game that rewards and penalties are strictly
positive and negative respectively for both players. We con-
sider a game scenario in which the defender only plays a
pure behavioral strategy in Xpure = {x : x(m | ht) =
1, for some m ∈M,∀ht}.
Theorem 3. In a finitely repeated Stackelberg security game
with |N| = 2, |Λ| = 2, and K = 1, if the defender only
plays a pure behavioral strategy in Xpure and the rewards
and penalties are strictly positive and negative respectively
for both the players, there exists a PBNE of the game in
which the attacker plays a myopic best response at every
history (ht,mt+1).
One significance of this preliminary result is that the
assumption about a myopic attacker in previous work on
finitely repeated Stackelberg security games is justified (at
least in the simple setting of this result) even when the at-
tackers care about future expected utility. In future research,
we aim to generalize this special case and explore the de-
ception patterns for multiple targets and multiple types in
the Stackelberg setting.
Experiments
We focus on the attacker’s strategic use of deception. In our
experiments, the players’ rewards and penalties are gener-
ated uniformly at random in the range [1, 10] and [−10,−1]
respectively.
Analysis of attacker deception
The purpose of deception is to shift the defender’s belief
away from the attacker’s true type. Any action on part of
the attacker toward this purpose must take into account sim-
ilar reasoning by other attacker types. Further, shaping the
belief of the defender is beneficial only if it results in a later
gain for the attacker. In the following, we present our results
with respect to an attacker of type 1. The behavior for other
attacker types is symmetric.
In our first experiment, we analyze games with num-
ber of attacker types: |Λ| = 2, number of targets: |N| ∈
{4, 6, 8, 10, 12}, and number of time steps |T| ∈ {2, 3}.
Results are shown in Figure 1(a)(b). The x-axis is the prior
probability of attacker type 1. The y-axis is the probability a
type-1 attacker attacks a myopically non-optimal target (i.e.,
probability of deceptive action, or “lie” for short) at time step
t = 1 or t = 2 (for 3-step games). Each data point is aver-
aged over 220 game instances. Figure 1(a) shows results for
2-step games; each curve corresponds to a number of tar-
gets. Overall, the attacker’s tendency to deceive is roughly
concave in the prior probability of its true type. This makes
sense, as deception has relatively less power to change the
beliefs of a defender when they start near extremes. We also
see an increase in deception with the number of targets. This
reflects the growth in options for deception, as well as in-
creased potential benefit for misleading the defender.
Results for 3-step games are shown in Figure 1(b). We
present deception probabilities for the attacker of type 1 at:
(1) Step 1; (ii) Step 2; (iii) Step 2-lie (step 2 conditioned that
the attacker lied at step 1); and (iv) Step 2-not lie (step 2
conditioned that the attacker did not lie at step 1). In this
figure, |N| = 4. As for the 2-step game, the probability of
deception in each case is roughly concave in the prior. The
probability of deception at step 1 is somewhat elevated in the
3-step game, since the attacker accrues longer-term benefit
from misleading the defender. Moreover, the peak is shifted
to the right, reflecting increased chance for successful decep-
tion given its opportunity to repeat the lie over two periods.
Indeed, given that the attacker lies at step 1, the attacker
lies with roughly proportional probability at step 2 (blue
curve versus yellow curve). On the other hand, when the at-
tacker does not lie at step 1, its pattern of deception at step 2
(purple curve) is qualitatively different. Switching to be de-
ceptive at step 2 is more promising at low priors (where the
act has some chance of misleading), and very unlikely at
high priors where there is little chance to mislead the de-
fender if it had not already started in step 1.
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Figure 1: Attacker deception analysis, attacker type 1.
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Figure 2: Solution comparison and runtime performance.
In our second experiment, we analyze deceptive strategies
of the attacker type 1 in 2-step games with the number of
attacker types is |Λ| = 3. In these games, |N| = 8. The re-
sult is shown in Figure 1(c). The x-axis and y-axis represent
prior probabilities of types 1 and 2 respectively. Figure 1(c)
shows that the attacker deception tendency is unimodal with
respect the prior of its type 1, and less sensitive ot the distri-
bution across other types.
In our third experiment, we vary the number of defender
resources in 2-step games with 2 attacker types. The result
is shown in Figure 1(d). When the number of defender re-
sources is high (close to the number of the targets), the de-
fender can provide a high coverage probability at all targets.
Specially, when K = |N|, the defender protects all targets
all the time. As a result, the attacker may not achieve any
benefit by lying. Therefore, the attacker lies less when K
gets closer to |N|.
Solution quality and runtime performance
In our last experiment, we compare the players’ utilities for
playing strategies computed in three scenarios:
1. Perfect Bayesian. The attacker is rationally deceptive and
the defender takes into account the potential deceit.
2. Myopic w/ Learn. The attacker is myopic and the de-
fender also assumes so.
3. Deceptive w/ Learn. The attacker is rationally deceptive
while the defender assumes the attacker is myopic.
The defender performs a Bayesian update on his belief about
the attacker’s type in all three cases. Results are shown in
Figures 2(a)(b)(c), averaging over 220 3-step game instances
with two attacker types and five targets. The x-axis is the
prior probability of type 1. The y-axis is the attacker util-
ity of each type or the defender utility on average. Fig-
ures 2(a)(b)(c) show if the defender does not account for
deception, the rationally deceptive attacker achieves a signif-
icant gain while the defender suffers a significant loss (yel-
low versus red curves). When the defender accounts for the
prospect of deception of the attacker, such gains and losses
are drastically reduced (blue versus red).
Finally, we display in Figure 2(d) the runtime perfor-
mance of our equilibrium-finding algorithm. The x-axis is
the number of targets and the y-axis is runtime in minutes.
For 2-step games, the runtime remains modest for up to ten
targets. For |T| = 3, the runtime grows quickly and exceeds
24 minutes when the number of targets is five.
Summary
We study the problem of deception in finitely repeated secu-
rity games. In these games, the defender collects attack data
over time to learn about the attacker type while the attacker
plays deceptively to mislead the defender. We present a de-
tailed analysis and computation of finding optimal strate-
gies of players in the games. We then show through com-
putational experiments that the attacker (defender) receives
a great benefit (loss) when the defender does not take into
account deceptive attacks. Conversely, such benefit (loss) is
reduced significantly when the defender addresses the at-
tacker’s deception.
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